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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
In 1962, the Rhode Island state legislature enacted a statute which ap-
pears to be quite unique in that it created a lien in favor of a motor vehicle
repairer upon any payment due an automobile owner under a collision
insurance policy.' This statute makes no mention of priorities with respect
to any other existing or subsequent security interests created in the auto-
mobile, and therefore poses several questions as to the effect of this lien upon
secured transactions in a state governed by the Uniform Commercial Code. 2
The first question to be considered is exactly what type of lien was
created by the statute. At common law an automobile repairer was given an
"artisan's lien" upon an automobile which he had repaired. The lien thus
created was founded upon possession of the automobile." However, in the
Rhode Island statute no mention is made of the requirement of possession
and the statute explicitly refers to. "any payment due the owner of said
vehicle, his representative or assignee." Thus, this lien is upon the insurance
proceeds and not upon the automobile, and does not require possession of
the automobile. Furthermore, this lien, unlike an artisan's lien, does not
require possession for its perfection. It is apparently a separate lien upon
insurance proceeds due the owner, distinct from the possessory lien upon
the automobile itself which the repairer was entitled to under the com-
mon law.
The requirement of possession and the nature of the lien has a greater
importance when one considers the-possible conflict between a financing
agency and the repairer over the insurance monies. Assuming that the
financing agency has a perfected security interest under the provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code, what rights, if any, does this secured party
have to the insurance moneys? 4
 The above question could become crucial
1
 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 9-3-9 & -JO (1962), effective July 1, 1962.
Motor Vehicle repairer's lien: Every motor vehicle repairer who shall furnish
material and labor, or either, in the repair of a motor vehicle, shall, if the owner
of said vehicle has insured said automobile against damage or loss by collision,
have a lien upon any payment due the owner of said vehicle, his representative
or assignee, on account of such insurance, to the amount of the reasonable and
necessary charges of such repairer up to the date of payment of such amount,
provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to give the
lien herein created precedence over the lien of an attorney.
Notice of repairer's lien: The lien provided in section 9-3-9 shall be effective
only if a written notice containing the name and address of the owner, the
date of the accident, and the name and address of the repairer shall be mailed,
postage prepaid, to the insurance carrier insuring against damage or loss by
collision prior to the payment of any moneys to the owner, his representative
or assignee in compensation for such damage or loss.
2
 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 6A-1-1Q1 to -9-507 (1962) contain the entire UCC as
adopted in Rhode Island. The UCC became effective in Rhode Island on January 2, 1962.
8 North End Auto Park, Inc. v. Petringa Trucking Co., 337 Mass. 618, 150 N.E.2d
735 (1958); Mortgage Sec. Co. v. Pfaffmann, 177 Cal. 109, 169 Pac, 1033 (1917).
4 Before the enactment of the UCC and at the present time, some courts hold
that the chattel mortgagee or conditional vendor has a superior right to the automobile
with respect to the repairer, while others consider the rights of the auto repairer
superior to that of the secured party. As to the basis of these theories and the courts
so holding, see generally Annots., 36 A.L.R.2d 198, 229 (1954).
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if there existed in the terms of the financing contract a provision that the
debtor would maintain insurance for the benefit of the secured party or "as
his interest may appear." Under applicable insurance law and equitable
concepts, the secured party would have at least an equitable lien upon the
insurance proceeds in the absence of the debtor's having taken out the con-
tract of insurance for the benefit of the secured party.° Also, if the debtor
had taken out the insurance for the secured party, the contract right to
the insurance would exist in the secured party and the lien could still be
said to attach to the proceeds on the basis of the secured party being in
reality the owner of the automobile! Therefore, the conflict would be
between an equitable lien or a contract right to the proceeds on the part
of the secured party and the statutory lien of the automobile repairer upon
the insurance money.
In a conflict between the secured party and the repairer the provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code are very significant. Under the Code if
a person, who in the ordinary course of his business furnishes services
or material with respect to goods subject to a security interest, has a
lien upon the goods in his possession by statute or rule of law for such
materials or services, the lien takes priority over a perfected security
interest' This section, derived from the Uniform Trusts Receipts Act,
is, according to the official comments, intended to cover the conflict between
an artisan whose lien arises from work intended to enhance or preserve
the value of the collateral and an earlier perfected security interest.° This
section limits the lien and priority to the goods in the possession of the
artisan. The lien created by the statute in Rhode Island is upon the in-
surance proceeds and makes no mention of any requirement of maintaining
possession. Therefore, it would appear that this section of the Code, while
intended to cover liens for services and materials, does not apply to this
particular statute.
Another possible section which may be of interest in this area would
be Section 9-306 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which defines "proceeds"
arising from the collateral. The section states: " `proceeds' includes whatever
is received when collateral or proceeds is sold, exchanged, collected or
otherwise disposed of. The term also includes the account arising when the
right to payment is earned under a contract right." Whether or not the
insurance is "proceeds" upon which the secured party has a security interest
is doubtful. This section is designed primarily to cover situations in which
the collateral is disposed of and allows the secured party to continue his
security interest in the proceeds obtained by the debtor from the disposal
of the collateral.° To include the insurance proceeds as "proceeds" within
5
 Wheeler v. Insurance Co., 101 U.S. 439 (1879) ; Butson v. Misz, 81 Ore. 607, 160
Pac. 530 (1916) ; Swearingen v. Hartford Ins. Co., 52 S.C. 309, 29 S.E. 722 (1898); 4
Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 2268 (1941).
6
 Since the statute reads "any payment due the owner . . . , his representative,
or assignee," it might be argued that the mortgagee as holder of the legal title is in
reality the owner under the terms of the statute.
7 UCC § 9 - 310.
s Comment 1 & 2 to UCC § 9-310.
9
 UCC § 9-306(2); Comment 1 & 2 to UCC § 9-306.
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the definition of section 9-306 would require an interpretation of this section
as including any money realized from the collateral during the existence
of the security interest. While the insurance proceeds upon realty are
applied to the debt upon the destruction of the property by statute in some
jurisdictions,'° such a holding, in the absence of complete destruction of
the property and explicit statutory authority, would appear to be over-
emphasizing the interest of the secured party.
The only possible application of the Uniform Commercial Code would
be that this lien, while outside the Code provisions due to its particular
language and subject matter, is within the intended scope and policy of
sections 9-306 and 9-310. The basis of this position could be found upon
the view that the insurance is money realized by the debtor upon the
collateral and thus similar to the "proceeds" of section 9-306; and the lien,
created by the statute is very similar to the lien described by section 9-310.
This would appear to be the most logical position in view of the provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code and the proximity of the lien to the
common law artisan's lien. Therefore, the secured party should not be
entitled to priority over the repairer.
This would seem to be contrary to Rhode Island case law, which,
prior to the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, has always held
that the rights of the conditional vendor and chattel mortgagee are superior
to the lien acquired by the artisan." This would then raise a basic question
of interpretation of the Code: whether or not its policy is to be followed
in situations where a policy is decreed but, due to the particular nature
of the statute, it is not explicitly covered by the Code.
In conclusion, this particular statute, while unique to Rhode Island,
can be used to advantage by other states. When a state passes a statute
dealing with the creation of a lien or bearing directly upon existing security
interests, the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code and the policy
set out therein should be kept in mind, and direct reference either to its
policy and provisions as governing the particular statute or an incorporation
of its policy within the statute should be declared. In following this a twofold
benefit would be derived: the basic uniformity of the provisions throughout
the country would be maintained and the growth of exceptions to its basic
provisions would not be encouraged. In the absence of this type of legis-
lation, laws pertaining to security interests, which fall outside the explicit
terms of the Uniform Commercial Code, could be interpreted to be gov-
erned by the various rules formulated prior to the Code. In this manner
a diversity of rules regarding security interests so deplored would again
be fostered.
ROBERT T. TOBIN
10 New York Lien Law § 4a.
11 Caldwell v. Boss, 85 R.I. 178, 128 A.2d 836 (1957); Goldstein v. Mack Motor
Truck Co., 56 R.I. 1, 183 Atl. 136 (1936); Arnold v. Chandler Motors, 45 R.I. 469,
123 Atl. 85 (1924).
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